REUTERS | Michaela Rehle
August 7, 2020

Arguments on the provisions and application of CPR 44.13-17: Anne Morgan (on behalf of herself and of the estate of Mr Christopher John Morgan) v Dr Chongtham Singh

By way of background, the claim in Anne Morgan (on behalf of herself and of the estate of Mr Christopher John Morgan) v Dr Chongtham Singh related to a medical negligence matter and centres around the alleged negligent treatment of a Baker’s cyst. The claimant, Christopher Morgan, instructed Irwin Mitchell and entered into a conditional fee agreement (CFA) which provided for a success fee. However, as a result of an unrelated condition, Mr Morgan sadly passed away in December 2014. His wife, Anne Morgan, decided to pursue the claim on behalf of the estate and herself. She subsequently entered into a post-Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) CFA which, under the subsequent rules, meant that she was not entitled to a success fee. Continue reading →

REUTERS | Hyungwon Kang
August 6, 2020

“Dieselgate” before the European Court of Justice

In Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI) v Volkswagen AG, the European Court of Justice determined whether the special jurisdiction provisions of article 7(2) of the Brussels I (Recast) Regulation (1215/2012) should be interpreted in a way which permitted Austrian courts to exercise jurisdiction over Volkswagen, the German-domiciled car manufacturer, in respect of claims for compensation arising out of the purchase in Austria of VW cars which had been equipped in Germany with a software “defeat device” to manipulate emissions figures, contrary to the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. Continue reading →

REUTERS | Mohamed Abd El Ghany
August 5, 2020

To be (full and) frank, take accusations of material non-disclosure seriously

Without notice applications carry with them a duty on the applicant to provide full and frank disclosure: that is, disclosure to the court of all objectively material facts, including those which it is anticipated would be raised by the other side if it were present (Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd). If the applicant is found substantially or deliberately to have breached their duty of full and frank disclosure, there is a rebuttable presumption that the order made without notice will be immediately discharged (National Bank Trust v Yurov and others). Given the potential negative consequences for the party, not to mention the criticism and potential sanction of their legal advisers for a breach of their personal duties to the court, giving full and frank disclosure is to be taken seriously. Indeed, much time and cost is incurred in the preparation of without notice applications by first raising, and then dispensing with, the potential arguments that the other side might raise. Continue reading →