REUTERS | GCS

The second part of this blog post looks at Lavender J’s reasons, in Belsner v Cam Legal Services Ltd, for allowing Ms Belsner’s appeal against District Judge Bellamy’s decision in which he had found that “informed consent” to the deduction of a success fee was not required where the solicitor relied on CPR 46.9(2), and that the retainer documentation was sufficiently clear that the client could be charged more than the costs of recovery from the losing defendant.

The background to and facts of this decision were explored in the first blog post which can be read here.

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REUTERS | Kai Pfaffenbach

Under CPR 31.22, a party to whom a document has been disclosed may only use it for the purpose of the proceedings in which it has been disclosed. There are some limited exceptions to this, the most important (for our purposes) being that the court may grant permission for the disclosure to be used for a collateral purpose.

There are obvious policy reasons behind CPR 31.22: disclosure is an invasive process and litigants have a legitimate entitlement to a degree of privacy. This is all the more important where it is not intended that the disclosing party will play a role in the resulting proceedings, as is generally the case under the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. The court will therefore only exercise its discretion to permit the collateral use of disclosed documents where it is in the interests of justice having regard to all the circumstances of the case.

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REUTERS | Miguel Vidal

Many lawyers face a dilemma while applying for litigation funding and insurance: how should they treat an unexpected mediation mid-application? While mediation is an important opportunity for any client, it can raise complicated questions on whether to put the funding and insurance applications on hold and try to settle or secure a funding arrangement while there is still an offer of funding on the table.

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